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FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING CO., FAIRWAY LIMITED, a partnership, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, JOHN MARK BANGERTER; 
BONNEVILLE ENGINEERING, INC.; TRUSWAL SYSTEMS, INC. (Respondent); 
COLONIAL LUMBER, INC.; and DIEHL LUMBER COMPANY (Appellant), 
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JOHN MARK BANGERTER, Third-PaHy Plaintiff, 
V. 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY; CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES; TRUCK 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE and FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Appeal from the Final Judgment of the Second Judicial 
District Court of Davis County, Utah 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Presiding 
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
FAIRWAY LIMITED AND FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING CO. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant-Appellant, Diehl Lumber Company (Diehl or Diehl Lumber) brings 
this appeal from a final judgment of the District Court. The Utah Supreme court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, § 3 of the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented are: 
1. Whether the District Court properly exercised its discretion in 
permitting plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add a strict liability count before trial 
pursuant Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where Diehl Lumber knew of 
plaintiff's intent to plead strict liability and was not unavoidably prejudiced in any way 
by the amendment. 
2. Whether the jury's finding that Diehl Lumber was a broker of lumber 
roof trusses is supported by substantial evidence where the record shows: 
— that Diehl established separate sales categories for the brokered sale 
of lumber products, and specifically the "brokerage sale of roof 
trusses"; 
— that Diehl was promoting the sale of roof trusses manufactured by 
Truss Teck, Inc. — a company owned and operated by the son of the 
president of Diehl Lumber; 
that Diehl collected a fee of at least 5% on any sales of roof trusses 
manufactured by Truss Teck; 
that almost half of Diehl's gross revenues were derived from its 
brokerge business; 
that Diehl exclusively handled the billing for all truss sales on its own 
invoices; 
that Diehl's own chief financial officer admitted that in 1979, Diehl 
was a broker of roof trusses and was brokering trusses for "primarily 
Truss Teck, Inc." 
3. Whether Diehl Lumber is liable to plaintiffs for their damages caused 
by defective roof trusses under the doctrine of strict liability in tort where Diehl 
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actively participated in the chain of distribution that carried Truss Teck's roof trusses to 
end users? 
4. Whether the trial Court properly instructed the jury as to the law of 
strict liability in tort, as that law is applied nationwide? 
5. Whether the trial court properly allowed plaintiff's to introduce 
relevant evidence of Diehl's gross revenues and Diehl's special relationship with Truss 
Teck, Inc. in order to establish its strict liability claim? 
6. Whether the jury's verdict that Truswal was not at fault is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Preliminary 
The statement of facts presented by Diehl Lumber is incomplete in several 
material respects. For instance, Diehl omits any reference to tne testimony of its chief 
financial officer, Bruce Hiller, that: 
He understood the concept of a brokered sale within the lumber 
industry, and 
Diehl was primarily brokering trusses for Truss Teck in 1979. 
The following additional facts are therefore pertinent. 
The Parties 
Plaintiff Fairway Distributing Company is a distributor of food products, 
which were stored in a warehouse located at 100 N. 600 West Street in Farmington, 
Utah. (Tr. 68, 414) Plaintiff Fairway, Ltd. owned this warehouse and leased it to 
Fairway Distributing. (Tr. 69) Plaintiffs purchased this warehouse in 1982 from 
defendant Bangerter. (Tr. 423) Bangerter built the warehouse in 1979 with component 
parts, including a roof truss system purchased from defendant Colonial Lumber. (PI. Exh. 
6, R. 1570) Colonial was in the retail lumber business; it acquired the roof trusses 
through Diehl Lumber — a wholesaler and broker of lumber products. (Tr. 117, 145, 
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344) The roof trusses were manufactured by Truss Teck, Inc. (Tr. 306-09, Df. Exh. 1, R. 
1570) Defendant Truswal Systems, Inc. (Truswal) makes barbed plates which, along with 
a design, are sold for use in the manufacturing of roof trusses. (Tr. 212) 
This is a strict liability case. The jury held Diehl Lumber strictly liable for 
the damages plaintiffs suffered when the truss system failed, resulting in the collapse of 
the roof over plaintiffs1 warehouse. 
Diehl Lumber — A Predominant Presence 
in the Intermountain Region Lumber Industry 
Diehl Lumber has been in the lumber business since 1957 when Lawrence Diehl 
started the company. (Tr. 293, 330) Diehl has 85 employees. It is engaged primarily in 
the distribution and sale of wood products such as lumber and plywood, pine, cedar , 
laminated beams and flooring. (Tr. 330) Diehl sells its products throughout Utah and the 
surrounding states, and on occasion in other states of the country. (Tr. 331) Diehl's gross 
sales in 1979 totaled $39,000,000. (Tr. 331) As Lawrence Diehlfs son, Gary, stated — 
Diehl Lumber has been in the business in this area "quite a while11 and "its a substantial 
company with a well-established sales record". (Tr. 297) 
A Major Portion of Diehl's Revenue 
Was Derived From Its Brokerage Business 
Diehl's chief financial officer, Bruce Hiller, testified that Diehl was in the 
business of making three separate types of sales. Diehl's invoices contain a box entitled 
"sales category". Depending upon the type of sale, Diehl would assign a " 1 " , "2" or "3" to 
the box entitled "sales category". (Tr. 344; PI. Exh. 11, 12; R. 1570) 
As explained by Hiller, category "one" constituted yard sales of lumber. (Tr. 
344, 347) Under this category, Diehl made wholesale sales of lumber products to lumber 
yards. (Tr. 354) 
Category "two" constituted "brokerage sales of buildings products". (Tr. 344) 
In this situation, a Diehl salesman would get an order for a particular product. He would 
call a number of lumber mills to get bids on products. He would then find a price that he 
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liked, and quote the ultimate buyer the price. Diehl would then notify the manufacturer 
to ship the goods directly to the buyer. (Tr. 362) Category Mthree,f constituted 
"brokerage sales of trusses'1. (Tr. 344) 
Diehl!s fees on its brokered sales of lumber products i.e., its gross profit, 
ranged between 4% and 12%, depending upon market conditions and what its competition 
was charging. (Tr. 359) 
In 1979, approximately 35% to 50% of Diehl's gross revenue of $39,000,000 
was derived from brokered sales. (Tr. 333) 
Diehl Lumber Was Brokering Lumber Roof Trusses 
In 1979 Primarily For a Company Called Truss Teck 
Bruce Hiller understood the concept of a brokered sale "within the lumber 
industry". (Tr. 332-33) He admitted that in 1979 Diehl was brokering trusses for 
"primarily Truss Teck." (Tr. 340) Diehl also delivered trusses made by Truss Teck on 
occasion if asked to do so by the customer. (Tr. 339-41) 
Truss Teck — A Fledgling Truss Manufacturing 
Company Owned By Lawrence Diehl's Son 
Which Grew Rapidly With the Help of Diehl Lumber 
Truss Teck was a manufacturer of lumber roof trusses. (Tr. 295) This 
company was started in 1978 by Gary Diehl, the son of Lawrence Diehl — the president 
of Diehl Lumber. (Tr. 292, 294-95) 
Gary Diehl attended the University of Utah for two years studying 
accounting. (Tr. 293) He left college in 1977, and a year later at the age of 24 he 
started up Truss Teck, becoming its first and only president. (Tr. 292, 294-95) Despite 
having no previous background in engineering or the lumber and truss business, Gary 
Diehl with the help of his father wanted to start getting "involved in the manufacture of 
roof trusses": 
Q. "Did you talk to your father, Lawrence Diehl, before you started Truss 
Teck, Inc.? 
A. Yeah. We talked quite a bit. 
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Q. And did he offer to help you out in getting started in business? 
A. Well, he, like any other father, he offered to help with, you know, 
anything he could do. 
Q. And that was certainly welcomed by you. 
A. Well, yes. 
Q. Well, it was. You wanted to get a business started. 
A. Yeah." 
(Tr. 295, 297) 
Truss Teck sold trusses all over Utah and surrounding states — the same sales 
region in which Diehl sold lumber. (Tr. 300, 331) Many of Truss Teck's customers were 
also customers of Diehl Lumber. (Tr. 298) This was so because, as Gary Diehl explained, 
you canft make trusses without lumber and Diehl sold the lumber: 
Q. ". . . you testified . . . that Diehl and Truss Teck shared some 
customers. That's because you can't have a truss — make a roof 
without the plywood, right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And the people that bought trusses from you were retailing lumber 
yards and hardware stores. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And they are the same people that buy plywood from Diehl Lumber. 
A, That's correct." 
(Tr. 320). 
Truss Teck was in the truss manufacturing business from 1978 until 1982. In 
1979, after only one year of operation, Truss Teck had gross sales of more than 
$100,000. (Tr. 298-99) In another year, it generated over $200,000 in gross revenues. 
(Tr. 299) During this time, as Bruce Hiller explained, Diehl Lumber was referring all 
truss customers to Truss Teck. (Tr. 339-40) 
The payment for any trusses manufactured by Truss Teck was also handled by 
Diehl Lumber. After Truss Teck had manufactured trusses for a certain customer, such 
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as a retailing lumber yard or hardware store, an invoice for payment was sent directly to 
the customer by Diehl Lumber. (Tr. 310-311; PI. Exh. 11, 12; R. 1570) Payment was 
made directly to Diehl Lumber for the truss system; no monies were received by Truss 
Teck. (Tr. 311) Diehl would always deduct for itself a certain percentage of the gross 
sales figure on the invoice and then remit the balance to Truss Teck. (Id.) Rather than 
making an hourly charge, Diehl was taking a fee of 5% or "a little better" of the gross 
sales figure on such invoices in 1979, regardless of the amount of the sale. (Tr. 312, 
358) Diehl used its own invoices in collecting payment for the trusses, instead of a Truss 
Teck invoice. (PI. Exh. 11,12; R. 1570) These invoices, generated by Diehl Lumber, did 
not give the customer any indication that Truss Teck manufactured the trusses. (Tr. 325; 
PI. Exh. 11, 12; R. 1570) 
Diehl Later Took Over The Manufacturing 
Of Trusses From Truss Teck 
In early 1982, Truss Teck began to share office space with Diehl Lumber. (Tr. 
296) Shortly thereafter Gary Diehl wanted "to just get out of the company". (Tr. 300) 
Truss Teck sold its manufacturing equipment to Diehl Lumber; Diehl also retained "all 
the records that related to any . . . roof truss manufacturing jobs that Truss Teck had 
done". (Tr. 300-01) Gary Diehl became an employee of his father and was involved in 
the manufacture of trusses under the Diehl corporate name, which Diehl sold as its own 
product. (Tr. 302) In 1984, after a further two year stint in the truss manufacturing 
business with his father, Gary Diehl started another business, managing two tanning 
salons. (Tr. 294) 
Diehl Lumber Acted As A Broker Of The 
Roof Trusses Used In The Construction 
Of Plaintiffs' Warehouse In 1979 
In 1979, Bangerter placed an order with Colonial Lumber for one flat truss 
roof system which was used in the construction of the Fairway warehouse roof. (Tr. 119, 
121-23; PI. Exh. 6, R. 1570) This truss system was bought and sold by Colonial to 
Bangerter through Diehl Lumber. (Tr. 116-17) 
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Rodney Gibson, a former Colonial partner and sales manager, testified that 
Colonial sold different materials, including trusses, at retail. (Tr. 116) Gibson explained 
that Colonial's products were purchased through Diehl Lumber: 
Q. ,f. . . Did you have a contract with Diehl Lumber? 
A* x es. . . • 
Q. And did you acquire lumber and trusses through Diehl Lumber (in 
1979)? 
* * * 
A« (In) 1979 we were buying lumber and plywood from Diehl Lumber. We 
were invoiced on trusses through Diehl Lumber. 
* * * 
Q. Did you have, in the f79 period, did you ever receive an invoice from 
Truss Teck? 
A, I never received an invoice from Truss Teck . 
* * * 
[T]he trusses and lumber were bought through Diehl Lumber." 
(Tr. 117). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 is a Diehl invoice showing the sale of the roof trusses to 
Colonial Lumber on July 31, 1979. (PI. Exh. 11, R. 1570) The invoice bears the number 
"27605", and indicates that this sale of trusses fell into "sales category three" — which is 
the category used by Diehl Lumber for the brokered sale of roof trusses. (Id., Tr. 344) 
Bruce Hiller explained that Diehl acted as a broker in the sale of these trusses: 
Q, ". . . [T]here were some trusses sold to Colonial Lumber in accordance 
with the Exhibit No. (11) which has an invoice date of July 31, 1979, 
Invoice No. 27605. Now describe for me the process that would have 
taken place in the ordering of that and how Diehl Lumber ordered and 
where they got the trusses from and how the order was filled and the 
billing. 
* * * 
A. To the best of my knowledge we were a broker of trusses. In 1979, if 
an order for trusses was called from a customer it would have had to of 
gone to another company such as one who manufactured trusses. That 
company would deliver them. We would broker trusses for a 
company and do the billing and sometimes ship trusses in our trucks 
with other materials as a convenience and take a broker commission 
only. . . . 
Q. So if someone called you, say, Colonial Lumber called and wanted to 
buy some trusses from Diehl Lumber, was it a procedure that you would 
then refer them to another company? 
A. We would refer them to the manufacturer. 
Q. In this instance who were you brokering trusses for in 1979? 
A. Primarily, Truss Teck, Inc." 
(Tr. 339-40) 
The Manufacture of Roof Trusses 
In manufacturing trusses, Truss Teck ordinarily used engineering designs and 
truss plates from truss designers/engineers. (Tr. 303) Truss Teck's staff would use the 
designs and plates to construct the trusses by using machinery to exert pressure so as to 
attach the steel connection plates to the lumber and compress them together. (Tr. 308) 
The resulting product was a roof truss. 
In 1979, Truss Teck used Truswal plates. Truss Teck purchased these plates 
and stocked them in standard sizes. When Truss Teck was manufacturing a truss for a 
customer, it would call Truswal which would provide an engineering drawing or diagram 
to be used in the manufacture of the trusses. (Tr. 307-08, 312-13) Truss Teck used 
Truswal plates in its construction of the roof trusses for the Fairway warehouse (Tr. 214) 
The Collapse of the Roof — Caused 
For the Most Part by "Sloppy Fabrication" 
Of the Trusses by Truss Teck 
The roof of the Fairway warehouse collapsed on January 24, 1984. (Tr. 2) 
Immediately after this collapse, plaintiffs retained Mr. Arnold Coon to investigate the 
cause of the roof failure. (Tr. 180) Mr. Coon received his degree in structural 
engineering from the University of Utah, and is a recognized expert in this field. He had 
been a senior partner in the firm of Coon & King Engineering, and was personally 
involved in the structural design of several buildings at the University of Utah, Brigham 
Young University, Utah State University and other buildings worldwide. Mr. Coon has 
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investigated a large number of roof failures, similar to the roof failure occurring at the 
Fairway warehouse. (Tr. 174-76, 181). 
Mr. Coon's investigation revealed two causes for the roof failure. First, the 
steel plates used during manufacturing to connect the lumber to form a truss were not 
large enough and secondly, the steel plates were improperly placed upon the wood 
members during manufacturing. (Tr. 192-93). For example, Mr. Coon was shown 
plaintiffs1 Exhibit 39 — an end of one of the trusses taken from the scene of the 
collapse. (Tr. 190) Mr. Coon opined that the misplacement of the steel plates on this 
truss was a significant cause leading to the failure of the truss system and the collapse of 
the roof: 
"This 2x4 has a finish of 3 and 1/2 inches. If these plates (had) been put in 
according to the code and EPI standards, the plate would have been exactly on 
the center of the 2x4 and there would have been a quarter of an inch of wood 
showing on either side of it." 
"The fact that this (plate) was put on askew caused some secondary stresses 
that were significant . . . many times the misplacement of plates is a thing 
that triggers collapse. . . ." 
(Tr. 192) 
During his investigation Mr. Coon also took photographs of the trusses. (Tr. 
194; PI. Exh. 15-38, R. 1570) Mr. Coon examined these photographs opining that the 
trusses were poorly manufactured: 
— The photograph of the truss in Exhibit 37 shows that the plate was off-
center indicating "an element of sloppiness and poor quality control in 
the fabrication of the trusses". (Tr. 197); 
— The photograph of the truss in Exhibit 38 shows that the plate had been 
placed much lower than it should have been and only a very small area 
of the plate is making a connection — "I have experienced failures that 
have occurred as a result of that sloppy type of fabrication." (Tr. 198); 
— The photograph of the truss in Exhibit 23 shows that the plate "missed 
the piece of wood altogether which, again, indicates the sloppy 
fabrication." (Tr. 202-03) 
Diehl's expert, Mr. Vance Christensen found Mr. Coon's report on the roof's 
collapse "very informative" and agreed in large part with it. (Tr. 405) Mr. Christensen 
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agreed that the misplacement of the plates by the truss manufacturer "does have an 
effect. It certainly does." (Tr. 391-92) 
Even Gary Diehl, whose firm manufactured these trusses, agreed they were 
sloppily made. Mr. Diehl was shown plaintiffs1 Exhibit 39 — part of the roof truss taken 
from the scene of the collapse — and admitted that the plates were misplaceds "I can 
see quite a bit wrong with that." (Tr. 323) 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint 
Plaintiffs initiated this action on November 27, 1984, against Diehl Lumber 
and other parties. (R. 2-9) The complaint charged Diehl with breaching its implied 
warranty concerning the fitness of the roof trusses, and negligently supervising their 
installation. (R. 4-6) Plaintiffs sought damages for the destruction of their building and 
its contents. (R. 2-9) 
Plaintiffs Sought To Amend Their Complaint 
8 Months After Bringing Their Action 
On July 19, 1985, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint for the reason 
that discovery showed that additional parties and an additional claim should have been 
added to the complaint. (R. 163-65) Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint along with 
their motion seeking to add an eighth claim sounding in strict liability against all 
defendants. (R. 163-65, 167-77) Plaintiffs also sought to add their insurer, American 
Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, as an additional plaintiff, and John Mark 
Bangerter, d/b/a Bangerter Construction Corporation, J.C. Bangerter & Sons, Inc., and 
Bangerter Development Corporation as additional defendants. (R. 163-65, 167) 
Diehl did not object to plaintiffs1 motion to add strict liability. (R. 240; Tr. of 
6/23/87, at 32) In fact, on August 30, 1985 Diehl filed a cross-claim against Colonial 
seeking recovery from Colonial if Diehl was held liable to plaintiffs under strict liability: 
"Any liability of (Diehl) to plaintiffs is derivative to liability created by the 
manufacturer of the trusses which are the subject of plaintiffs' complaint, 
which manufacturer is Colonial Lumber, Inc., because this defendant acted, if 
at all, only as an intermediate purchaser-seller in the chain of distribution. 
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(R. 242) (emphasis supplied) 
Only the new defendants plaintiffs sought to name objected to being named as 
parties. (R. 180-83, 188-89) Because of these objections, the Court ordered plaintiffs to 
file factual statements showing the necessity for additional parties. (R. 240) Plaintiffs 
later decided not to name additional parties and, therefore, did not file these 
statements. (R. 550) Because these factual statements were not filed, the trial court 
denied plaintiffs1 motion on September 12, 1985. (R. 245) However, since neither the 
court nor any of the defendants objected to the strict liability count, plaintiffs believed 
that "the motion relative to the strict liability (count) had been granted and was in the 
case." (Tr. of 6/23/87 at 33) 
Plaintiffs1 Second Motion 
To Amend The Complaint 
The trial of this cause was initially set for July 29, 1987. (R. 306) Before 
trial, plaintiffs discovered that no formal order had been entered granting them leave to 
add the strict liability claim. (Tr. of 6/23/87 at 33) Plaintiffs immediately brought this 
matter to the court's attention on June 17, 1987, seeking relief under Rule 60, and 
alternatively under Rule 15(a) to amend their complaint to add strict liability. (R. 548-
51) This time, Diehl objected claiming that it would be prejudiced by the amendment. 
(R. 739) Diehl further claimed that the strict liability count lacked merit because Diehl 
did not sell trusses, but "simply referred the buyer to a seller, took a commission and 
handled the accounting." (R. 748) Diehl's counsel expanded on this point at the hearing 
on plaintiffs1 motion to amend by stating: 
"Diehl would send out an invoice to Truss Teek's customer to collect it and the 
reason that they did that . . . is very simple. Two things. One, is that it was a 
matter of convenience for all concerned. Nobody buys trusses without buying 
plywood. You have to have something to put on it to make a roof. You don't 
have trusses over our head and Diehl Lumber sold plywood, Truss Teck did 
not. So, Diehl Lumber would sell the plywood, add it to their invoice, add 
trusses to the invoice and collect the whole thing and remit Truss Teek's share 
to Truss Teck." 
(Tr. of 6/23/87 at 40) 
-11-
After hearing arguments on this motion, Judge Cornaby allowed plaintiffs to 
file their amended complaint, stating that "the intent of the court was not to prevent the 
plaintiff from being heard on the legitimate cause of action." (R. 753) The court also 
rescheduled the trial date, giving defendants three additional months, until October 28, 
1987, to prepare for trial. (R. 754) 
Diehl's Motion for Summary Judgment 
In the interim between the amendment of the complaint and trial, Diehl 
conducted no additional discovery in order to prepare its defense on strict liability. (See 
R. 756-1330) Instead, Diehl filed a motion for summary judgment on the strict liability 
claim. (R. 850-51) 
Plaintiffs opposed this motion on the grounds that: 
Diehl acted as a full-service broker of trusses and was therefore an 
active party in the chain of distribution of those trusses; 
Diehl could be held strictly liable for plaintiffs1 damages pursuant to 
the doctrine of successor liability. 
(R. 896-909) 
The trial court denied Diehl's motion for summary judgment on October 27, 
1987, stating: 
"I cannot tell from what has been given me whether . . . its strictly 
bookkeeping, just a service to Truss Teck, or is it a brokerage? I see it as a 
question of fact. It's along with the successor liability. I think both of those 
are things that bring it into question that you are going to have to present to a 
jury and the jury is going to have to make the decision. So, the motion for 
summary judgment is not appropriate." 
(Tr. of 10/27/87 at 15) 
THE TRIAL 
Plaintiffs1 Impeachment of Bruce Hiller — 
The High Point of the Trial 
Plaintiffs called Bruce Hiller, Diehl's chief financial officer, to describe 
Diehl's role in the distribution of the trusses used in the construction of the Fairway 
warehouse roof. (Tr. 328-45) Hiller attempted, during his testimony, to minimize Diehl's 
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role in the distribution of these trusses. For example, Hiller was asked: 
Q. ". . . [I]n 1979 when Diehl Lumber Products got an inquiry from a 
customer for a roof truss system, somebody called you and said I need 
roof trusses for a commercial building. In 1979 Diehl Lumber Products 
was routing all those customers and all those roof truss sales to Truss 
Teck for manufacturing by Truss Teck, correct?" 
Hiller answered: 
A. "I donft have a personal knowledge of that because I never got involved 
in the sales end of the business.11 
(Tr. 337) With the Court's permission, plaintiffs were allowed to publish Hiller's prior 
deposition testimony to the jury. 
In his prior deposition, Hiller described Diehl's actual role in the distribution 
of trusses. With respect to plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, showing the sale of the roof trusses 
from Diehl to Colonial, Hiller affirmatively testified: 
that Diehl was "a broker of trusses"; 
— that "in 1979 if an order for trusses was called from a customer it 
would have had to have gone to another company such as one who 
manufactured trusses"; 
— that Diehl "would broker trusses for a company and do the billing and 
sometimes ship trusses in our trucks with other materials as a 
convenience and take a broker commission"; 
that if Colonial Lumber called and wanted to buy trusses from Diehl, 
Diehl "would refer them to the manufacturer"; 
— that in 1979 Diehl Lumber was brokering trusses for "primarily, Truss 
Teck, Inc." 
(Tr. 338-40). 
Similarly, Hiller attempted to downplay the fact that Diehl had established an 
entire separate sales category for the brokered sale of trusses. Hiller was asked the 
following questions with respect to plaintiff's Exhibits 11 and 12: 
Q* ". . . [0]n both exhibits there is an item called 'sales category' and 
there is a number '3' in there. Doesn't the No. 3 stand for brokered sale 
of trusses? 
A, It stands for sale of trusses. 
Q. Stands for a brokered sale of trusses, doesn't it? 
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A. There is no differentiation made between a sale of trusses and a 
brokerage sale of trusses. Truss sales were put in that category three." 
(Tr. 341-42). 
Again, with the permission of the Court, plaintiffs were allowed to publish 
Hiller's deposition testimony in which he affirmatively stated that Diehl had established 
three separate sales categories — category "3" being brokerage sales of trusses: 
Q. "Is category three trusses or is that broker items or what are the 
different categories, 1-2-3? What do they stand for? 
A. Category one would have been yard sales. Category two would have 
been brokerage sales of building products. Category three would have 
been brokerage sales of trusses. 
(Tr. 344) 
Diehl Produced No Direct Evidence Showing 
That Truswal Was At Fault 
Diehl was able to fully litigate the issue of Truswal's fault at trial. Diehl 
simply failed to produce any direct evidence that Truswal provided Truss Teck with any 
design, much less an erroneous one, for the manufacture of the roof truss system. Diehl's 
own expert, Vance Christensen, made this clear by explaining that he had never seen nor 
reviewed any "design drawings that were . . . sent by any engineering firm to" Truss 
Teck. (Tr. 408) Despite the absence of a design, Diehl attempted to build a case against 
Truswal on the basis of belief, not evidence. 
For example, Diehl's expert, Vance Christensen, contended he was able to give 
an opinion on who the design firm was and what they did or did not do notwithstanding 
the absence of a design: 
Q. ". . . Now you indicated that you have never seen any design drawings 
that were actually used. 
A. That is correct. I have not. 
Q. That were actually sent by any engineering firm to the company that 
built the trusses. 
A. No. 
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Q. Therefore, you could not give an opinion on what the design firm that 
sold the plan did or did not do. 
A. I feel that I can give an opinion, yes, sir. 
Q. You are prepared to give an opinion on what a design firm did even if 
you have not seen their work? 
A. The standards in the industry. 
* * * 
Q. You are prepared to give an opinion on the conduct of a company 
without looking at their plans? 
A. Yes. 
<}• What is that opinion? 
A. That opinion is that the standard practice of persons furnishing 
manufactured products is to furnish designs along with those 
products. . . ." 
(Tr. 408). 
Unlike Christensen, Mr. Arnold Coon would not render an opinion on matters 
that he had no knowledge of. For example, Mr. Coon was not prepared to give an opinion 
that Truswal furnished Truss Teck with design information because he had no firsthand 
knowledge of it. Also, he was not prepared to give an opinion that if Truswal supplied 
design information to Truss Teck, that the design information was actually used by Truss 
Teck in fabricating the trusses. (Tr. 277) 
Mr. Coon did testify however, that in his 39 years as a structural engineer, he 
has never seen a design drawing by a design firm "that tells somebody to do a half-way 
job." (Tr. 277-28) Mr. Coon found "it certainly is a possibility" that a truss manufacturer 
could use Truswal plates, but not their design. (Tr. 278) 
Diehl Granted A Directed Verdict 
On Successor Liability 
At the close of plaintiffs1 case, Diehl moved for a directed verdict on both 
strict liability and successor liability. (Tr. 363) The trial Court denied this motion with 
respect to strict liability, but granted it on successor liability. (Tr. 368) 
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The Jury Instructions 
The trial court charged the jury with respect to the law of strict products 
liability as follows: 
"The law involved in this lawsuit is known as the law of strict products 
liability. Pursuant to this law, manufacturers, distributors, brokers, as well as 
all other parties in the chain of distribution are strictly liable for damages 
caused by defectively designed products. This is true so long as the party is in 
the business of, and gains profit from, distributing or otherwise disposing of 
the product in question through the stream of commerce. The primary 
justification for extending strict liability to all in the chain of distribution is 
to provide the 'maximum of protection1 to the consumer. This policy is as 
applicable to those who never handle or control the product, as it is to those 
who do possess or control the product. In either case, consumer protection is 
the ultimate factor considered. Consequently, the handling or possession of 
the product is not a prerequisite to the imposition of strict liability." 
(R. 1349) 
At the instructions conference, Diehl raised only three objections to this 
instruction. First, Diehl objected to that portion of the instruction stating that the 
primary justification of strict liability was "the maximum of protection" to the 
consumer. Secondly, Diehl objected to that portion which stated that the policy 
underlying strict liability was applicable to those who never handle or control the 
product. (Tr. 50) Finally, Diehl objected to that portion of the instruction which charged 
that consumer protection is the ultimate factor considered. Diehl claimed that these 
portions misstated the law. (Tr. 450-51) 
The trial court also gave the jury the following instruction on the term 
"broker": 
Definition of Broker: An agent employed to make bargains and contracts for 
compensation. A middleman or negotiator between parties. A person whose 
business it is to bring buyer and seller together. Buyers and sellers of goods 
and negotiators between buyers and seller, but without having custody of the 
property. 
(R. 1360) Diehl did not object to this instruction, stating "(we) don't have a problem with 
the definition of broker except that we don't think brokerage is good enough to meet 
strict liability." (Tr. 452) 
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The Jury's Verdict 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor 
of plaintiffs and against Diehl. (R. 1375-77) Pursuant to a special verdict, the jury 
found, in pertinent part: 
— that Diehl was not merely a bookkeeper for Truss Teck for the truss 
sale involved in this case; 
— that Diehl was a broker between Colonial Lumber and Truss Teck for 
the truss sale involved in this case. 
(R. 1375-76). The jury awarded plaintiffs the amount of $75,000 as damages. (R. 1376) 
This verdict of $75,000 was later reduced by the amount of $6,500 — the damages paid by 
Truss Wall in settlement of plaintiffs1 claim. On February 4, 1988, the trial court 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Diehl on the balance of $68,500, 
together with interest. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT -
THE CASE IN PERSPECTIVE 
This is a strict liability case. In order to hold Diehl responsible for the 
damages they suffered due to the defective roof trusses, plaintiffs had the burden of 
showing: 
— that the trusses were defective; 
— that the defects made the trusses unreasonably dangerous; 
— that these defects existed at the time the trusses left the control of 
Diehl; 
— that plaintiffs were injured; 
— that the defects in the trusses were a proximate cause of plaintiffs1 
injuries; 
that Diehl participated in the chain of distribution of these roof 
trusses. (R. 1351) 
In rendering a verdict in the favor of plaintiffs and against Diehl, the jury found that 
plaintiffs met their burden of proof. 
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In its brief on appeal, Diehl does not challenge the juryfs verdict except for 
one finding. Diehl expresses displeasure with the juryfs finding that it was a broker, and 
it selectively edits the evidence to evade the application of strict liability. Plaintiff's 
respectfully submit that the case described by Diehl is not the case which was tried 
below. 
Diehl would "wish away" the deposition testimony of its chief financial 
officer, Bruce Hiller. Hiller made clear that he understood the concept of a brokered 
sale within the lumber industry as one in which Diehl would arrange the sale of a product 
between the manufacturer and buyer, for a brokerage fee. (Tr. 332-33, 359, 362) Hiller's 
testimony made clear that Diehl was brokering trusses in much the same way for 
"primarily, Truss Teck, Inc." (Tr. 339-40) 
Diehl does more than ignore this evidence; Diehl keeps hidden from this Court 
the special relationship it had with Truss Teck — the company owned by Lawrence Diehl's 
son. Diehl Lumber was helping Truss Teck get started in the business of manufacturing 
trusses. As Bruce Hiller further admitted, when a truss customer called upon Diehl 
Lumber for trusses, it was Diehl's procedure to refer the customer to Truss Teck. 
(Tr. 339-40) The evidence makes clear that Diehl was actively involved for profit in not 
only brokering, but also marketing and distributing Truss Teck trusses. 
The Courts in this nation have spoken: the rule of strict liability as embodied 
in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts applies to all parties who 
participate in moving a defective product through the chain of production, marketing and 
distribution. See, e.g., Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 454 
N.E.2d 210, 216 (1983) Diehl was such a party. The imposition of strict liability on Diehl 
is justified on the ground that its position in the market process — indeed, its relationship 
with Truss Teck — enabled it exert pressure on Truss Teck to enhance the safety of the 
roof trusses. Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d at 216 (1983). 
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In an attempt to evade its responsibility to plaintiffs, Diehl raises a number 
specious procedural claims. For example, it erroneously contends that the trial Court 
erred by allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add strict liability. Plaintiffs 
moved to amend their complaint well before trial pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that leave should be "freely given when justice 
so requires." (U.R. Civ. Proc. 15(A)) The record makes clear the Diehl knew of plaintiffs 
intent to plead strict liability, it knew what its defense to that claim would be, and was 
not "unavoidably prejudiced" by the amendment. 
Diehl also claims that the trial Court erred by allowing plaintiffs to introduce 
relevant evidence of its gross revenues and its special relationship with Truss Teck. This 
evidence was pertinent to plaintiffs' strict liability claim as it showed that Diehl actively 
participated in the chain of distribution, and had the opportunity to influence Truss Teck 
to build a good and safe truss. Indeed, Diehl makes no argument, whatsoever, showing 
that this evidence was not relevant to plaintiffs1 claim. 
Finally, Diehl makes certain claims regarding Truswal. These claims can have 
no effect upon the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiffs1 and against Diehl, because the 
verdict against Diehl is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the 
law. However, Diehl's claims are without merit. 
Diehl complains in its brief that "it had a contribution claim and expected to 
have any judgment against it reduced by the greater of the amount Truswal's fault or the 
amount paid by Truswal in settlement and expected to have Truswal's fault determined at 
trial". (Applt. Br. p. 42) The record shows that Diehl got what it wanted. Diehl was able 
to fully litigate Truswal's fault at trial. Diehl simply failed to produce any direct 
evidence that Truswal was at fault. It was correct therefore for the jury to find that 




THE DECISION ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT 
BEFORE TRIAL PURSUANT TO RULE 15(A) RESTED WITH THE SOUND 
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. DIEHL'S BURDEN IN 
ATTEMPTING TO SET ASIDE THAT DECISION IS INSURMOUNTABLE. 
At the outset it must be noted that in an effort at misdirection, Diehl devotes 
substantial argument to the claim that plaintiffs' June 17, 1987 motion to amend their 
complaint to add a strict liability count was improperly granted under Rules 60(a) and (b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. While plaintiffs1 motion sought relief under Rule 
60, they alternatively sought leave to amend under Rule 15(a) which permits amendments 
and requires that leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so requires." (U.R. 
Civ. Proc. 15(a) (R. 548-51) The order allowing the amendment makes clear the Court 
was acting pursuant to its authority under Rule 15(a) and not Rule 60. It is therefore 
under Rule 15(a) that the order must be reviewed. 
The principles of law governing the application of Rule 15(a) are not subject 
to challenge. "The rule in this state has always been to allow amendments freely where 
justice requires, and especially is this true before trial." Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 
165, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971) (emphasis applied). The decision to grant leave to amend 
lies within the broad discretion of the trial court, and its rulings cannot be disturbed 
absent a showing of abuse of discretion resulting in "unavoidable prejudice" to the 
complaining party. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983). 
The record, which Judge Cornaby reviewed in allowing plaintiffs1 motion, 
shows that after the complaint was filed on November 27, 1984, plaintiffs learned 
through discovery that other parties and another count sounding in strict liability should 
have been added to the complaint. Plaintiffs immediately moved to amend the complaint 
on July 19, 1985 — eight months after the initial filing. Diehl had notice of Plaintiffs 
intent to plead strict liability, but did not object. Only the new defendants plaintiffs 
sought to name objected to being named as parties. (R. 180-83, 188-89) The court 
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ordered plaintiffs to file factual statements justifying additional parties, but — and this 
is significant — the Court did not require plaintiffs to further substantiate the strict 
liability count. Plaintiffs later decided not to name additional parties, and therefore did 
not file the factual statements. (R. 550) Because these factual statements were not 
filed, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion on September 12, 1985. (R. 245) However, 
since neither the defendants, nor for that matter the court, objected to the strict 
liability count, plaintiffs believed that the portion of their motion to add strict liability 
had been allowed. (Tr. of June 23, 1987 at 32) 
Before trial, plaintiffs discovered that no formal order was entered granting 
them leave to add strict liability. Plaintiffs immediately brought this matter to the 
court's attention on June 17, 1987, seeking only to add the strict liability count which 
plaintiff's believed had been added earlier. Judge Cornaby allowed this amendment, and 
for good reason. His Honor explained that it was never his intention in earlier denying 
the motion "to prevent the plaintiff(s) from being heard on a legitimate cause of action" 
such as the strict liability claim. (R. 753) The Court had denied plaintiff's July 19, 1985 
motion to amend simply because plaintiffs had not furnished the verified statements 
justifying the addition of new parties. However, Judge Cornaby, like Diehl, had no 
objection at that time to plaintiff's request to amend their complaint to add a strict 
liability count. 
Indeed, as his Honor obviously recognized, the amendment did no more than 
permit plaintiffs to obtain whatever legal relief was justified by the facts already 
established by discovery. The amendment added nothing new to the factual issues; all 
that was added was a new legal theory supported by the facts then in existence. In other 
words, the case was tried on matters discovered before the amended complaint was filed. 
Significantly, the record shows that far from being surprised at plaintiffs' 
amendment, Diehl had always been aware of their intention to pursue a strict liability 
claim. After plaintiffs initially sought to add strict liability, Diehl immediately filed a 
cross-claim against Colonial with respect to the strict liability claim. (R. 242-43) Diehl 
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alleged it was entitled to recovery from Colonial under strict liability because Diehl 
"acted, if at all, only as an intermediate purchaser-seller in the chain of distribution." 
(R. 242) This cross-claim was on file at the time of plaintiffs' amendment in June of 
1987; it had not been withdrawn. In denying that it was a link in the "chain of 
distribution" Diehl had notice throughout this litigation of Plaintiff's intention to pursue 
a strict liability claim. It is therefore absurd for Diehl to assert that it lacked fair 
notice of plaintiffs1 claim. (Applt. Br. p. 16) 
Likewise, Diehl was not "unavoidably prejudiced". In fact, there can be no 
prejudice in allowing an amendment where the adverse party is given an adequate 
opportunity to address the additional issue. See, Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee 
Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 450 (1973). The trial Court allowed 
Diehl three additional months to prepare for trial. During this time, Diehl could have 
requested further discovery on the strict liability issue, but chose not to do so. Instead, 
Diehl spent its time preparing and arguing a motion for summary judgment on strict 
liability based upon matters discovered prior to the amendment. 
Nor was Diehl's burden in preparing its defense any greater after the 
amendment than before. (Applt. Br. p. 17) Diehl claims that it required little trial 
preparation before the amendment because plaintiffs had insufficient evidence to 
proceed on the negligence and breach of implied warranty counts. Diehl points to a 
statement made at a pre-trial hearing on October 13, 1987, in which plaintiffs1 counsel 
informed the court they had elected not to proceed under negligence or breach of implied 
warranty. However, this statement was made months after the amended complaint was 
filed. 
At the time of the amendment, and before then, plaintiffs were also pursuing 
both a negligence and an implied breach of warranty claim against Diehl. Moreover, 
Diehl had cross-claims pending against both Colonial and Truswal at the time of the 
amendment. Prior to the amendment, Diehl still had to prepare for trial on plaintiffs' 
complaint and its cross-claims. Any important witnesses or documents which Diehl 
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needed from Colonial or Truswal should have been located and obtained earlier by Diehl 
through discovery. Moreover, because Gary Diehl later worked for Diehl, it would have 
been quite a simple matter for Diehl to locate witnesses from Truss Teck either before 
or after the amendment. Indeed, Diehl had an engineering expert at trial to present its 
case. 
More to the point, however, is the fact that Diehl's defense — although 
without merit — has been the same ever since Diehl filed its cross-claim against Colonial 
in August, 1985, to wit: that Diehl was only an intermediate purchaser-seller of trusses 
in the chain of distribution, i.e., a broker, and therefore was not liable to plaintiffs under 
the doctrine of strict liability. In short, Diehl knew of its defense long before the trial 
court formally allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint. 
Equally specious is Diehl's claim that had plaintiffs amended their complaint 
sooner, Diehl could have sought contribution or indemnity from Truss Teck. Diehl had 
earlier filed cross-claims seeking contribution or indemnity from other parties in the 
chain of distribution, such as Truswal and Colonial. Diehl could have, but chose not to, 
file any cross-claim for contribution or indemnity against Truss Teck. The reason is 
obvious. Truss Teck was owned by Gary Diehl, the son of Lawrence Diehl — the owner of 
Diehl Lumber. By the time of the truss failure in 1984, Diehl had purchased Truss Teck's 
manufacturing assets, obtained its business records, and was employing Gary Diehl and 
manufacturing trusses itself. (Tr. 301-02) Larry Diehl simply decided not to sue his own 
son. 
However, had Diehl chosen to seek contribution from Truss Teck, it was not 
bound by the statute of limitations applying to the underlying primary action, as Diehl 
erroneously claims. (Applt. Br. p. 18) Utah follows the majority rule, which holds that a 
statute of limitations applicable to the underlying primary action does not affect a joint 
tortfeasor's right to seek contribution. See, Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 
P.2d 1344, 1346 (Utah 1984); See also, Kutner, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: The 
Effects of Statutes of Limitations and Other Time Limitations, 33 Okla. L. Rev. 203 
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(1980). The rationale for this holding is that a right of contribution does not accrue until 
a defendant pays more than his share of the common liability. Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of 
LaVerkin, supra, 689 P.2d at 1346. Simply put, Diehl could have filed a contribution 
action against Truss Teck, if it wanted to. 
Finally, Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983) and Girard 
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983), cited by Diehl, arise under circumstances very 
different from those at bar. (Applt. Br. p. 16-17) 
In Westley, the Court affirmed the denial of leave to amend where the 
plaintiff had learned of the existence of a new allegation in a deposition, but waited a 
year before seeking an amendment. Unlike Westley, plaintiffs here acted diligently in 
seeking leave to amend in July of 1985, and in good faith believed that their complaint 
had been amended. 
Similarly, the decision in Girard is inapplicable. There, the Court found that 
leave to amend was properly denied where the motion was made on the day of the trial 
and sought to add a new and different cause of action. Here, plaintiffs1 motion was made 
before trial, and the strict liability count added nothing new to the factual issues that 
had been developed prior to the amendment. 
Diehl has failed to show that it was "unavoidably prejudiced" by the 
amendment of plaintiffs1 complaint. The trial court exercised its discretion in the 
furtherance of justice in allowing plaintiffs' motion to amend, and its order allowing this 
amendment should be affirmed. 
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II. 
THE JURYfS VERDICT AND JUDGMENT HOLDING DIEHL STRICTLY 
LIABLE TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE 
DEFECTIVE ROOF TRUSSES IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE AND IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW 
A. 
The Jury's Finding That Diehl Was 
A Broker Between Colonial Lumber And Truss Teck 
For The Truss Sale Involved In This Case Is 
Supported By Substantial Evidence 
It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence and make findings of fact. Williams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 
427, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (1965) Thus, a party claiming that the evidence does not support a 
jury's verdict carries a heavy burden. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 
1985) Where the evidence is conflicting and the jury is properly instructed, a court on 
review will not upset findings of fact except upon as showing that the evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, so clearly preponderates in appellant's favor 
that reasonable persons could not differ on the outcome of the case. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 
667 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983) 
There must be no mistake. The deposition testimony of Bruce Hiller, Diehl's 
chief financial officer, constitutes substantial evidence that Diehl was a broker between 
Colonial Lumber and Truss Teck for the truss sale involved in this case. 
Hiller made clear that Diehl Lumber is engaged in both the wholesale and 
brokered sale of lumber products. Thirty-five to fifty percent of Diehl's gross revenues 
were derived from the business of brokering products. Its business in brokering trusses 
was so extensive that it was treated as a separate type of sale on Diehl's sale invoices. 
(Tr. 344) Category "3" constituted "brokerage sales of trusses", such as the trusses used 
in the construction of the Fairway warehouse roof. (Id.) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 was a Diehl invoice showing the sale of the roof trusses 
to Colonial Lumber on July 31, 1979. (PI. Exh. 11, R. 1570) This invoice shows that this 
sale of trusses fell into "sales Category "3" — the category used by Diehl Lumber for the 
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brokerage sale of roof trusses. (Id., Tr. 344) Bruce Hiller explained that Diehl acted as a 
broker in the sale of these trusses: 
Q* ". . . [T]here were some trusses sold to Colonial Lumber in accordance 
with Exhibit No. (11) which has an invoice date of July 31, 1979, . . . 
now describe for me the process that would have taken place in the 
ordering of that and how Diehl Lumber ordered and where they got the 
trusses from and how the order was filled and the billing. 
* * * 
A. To the best of knowledge we were a broker of trusses. In 1979, if an 
order for trusses was called from a customer it would have had to have 
go to another company such as the one who manufactured trusses. 
That company would deliver them. We would broker trusses for a 
company and do the billing and sometime ship trusses in our trucks with 
other materials as a convenience and take a broker commission. . . . 
Q. So if someone called you, say, Colonial Lumber called and wanted to 
buy some trusses from Diehl Lumber, was it a procedure that you would 
then refer them to another company? 
A, We would refer them to the manufacturer. 
Q. In this instance who were you brokering trusses for in 1979? 
A* Primarily, Truss Teck, Inc.11 (Tr. 339-40) 
Furthermore, Hiller was not confused about Diehl's role as a broker in the sale 
of roof trusses, as Diehl maintains in its brief. (Applt. Br. pp. 34-39) Any alleged 
"confusion" by Hiller at trial resulted from his attempt at prevarication — to cover-up 
Diehl's actual role in the sale of these roof trusses. The jury was able to see through this 
ruse. 
Hiller understood the concept of a brokered sale "within the lumber 
industry". (Tr. 332-33) He understood Diehl's role in brokering building products as one 
in which Diehl would arrange the sale of a product between the manufacturer and a 
buyer. (Tr. 362) Diehl always profited from its brokerage efforts by charging a 
brokerage fee which ranged between 4% and 12%, depending upon what its competition 
was charging for similar sales. (Tr. 359) 
The brokered sale of a roof truss was handled in much the same way. Diehl 
would arrange a sale of trusses by bringing together the buyer with a manufacturer. At 
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times Diehl would even deliver the trusses in its own trucks. (Tr. 339-40) Diehl likewise 
profited from its efforts by taking a brokerage fee of 5% or "a little better" of the gross 
truss sales figure, regardless of the amount of the sale. (Tr. 312, 358) Diehl's 5% fee 
was deducted from the amount owing to Truss Teck, and in this respect it acted also as a 
sales agent for Truss Teck. In short, Diehl's role in brokering roof trusses was no 
different then its role in brokering other building products, except for the fact that as a 
sales agent it was somewhat less neutral in brokering Truss Teck's product. 
Moreover, Diehl processed the sales transaction as a broker, and not merely a 
bookkeeper, as the jury also correctly found. Unlike a bookkeeper, Diehl was taking a 
percentage of each truss sale rather than making a hourly charge. It cost the same 
amount for Diehl Lumber to process an invoice that was $3,000 as it did for one that was 
$30,000; its 5% fee thus for no relationship to that cost. In other words, Diehl Lumber 
was taking a typical brokerage commission for its efforts in arranging the sale of roof 
trusses, such as the sale between Truss Teck and Colonial Lumber. Furthermore, Diehl 
used its own sales invoices in collecting payment for the trusses; a bookkeeper would 
have used Truss Teck's invoices. (PI. Exh. 11, R. 1570) In short, Diehl was not an 
automatic data processing company which merely handled Truss Teckfs account 
receivables. Diehl was a broker arranging a sale of trusses by bringing buyer and seller 
together for a fee, as the Court instructed the jury. (R. 1359) 
But there was more to Diehl's role as a broker than just this. Diehl was in 
fact intimately involved in marketing the sale of trusses manufactured by Truss Teck. 
Diehl has been in the Lumber business for many years. It is a "substantial 
company with a well established sales record". (Tr. 297) Diehl's gross revenues of $39 
million established not only that it owned a major share of the lumber market in the 
intermountain region, but had developed a well satisfied clientele that came to rely and 
trust upon Diehl's judgment in lumber and building matters. 
Diehl had a special relationship with Truss Teck. Truss Teck was owned by 
Gary Diehl, the son of Lawrence Diehl — the president of Diehl Lumber. Gary Diehl had 
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studied accounting for only two years in college. He had no engineering background nor 
previous background in the lumber business. Yet, at the age of 24, he wanted to get 
"involved in the manufacture of roof trusses." (Tr. 295) He "wanted to get a business 
started", and his father helped him. (Tr. 297) 
Truss Teck got off to a tremendous start. In 1979, after only one year of 
operation, Truss Teck had grossed sales of more than $100,000. In another year, it 
generated over $200,000 in gross revenue. (Tr. 298-99) This phenomenal growth in sales 
for a fledgling business was not attributable to Gary Diehlfs business acumen in the 
lumber industry — he left the lumber business in 1984 to manage tanning salons. 
(Tr. 294) Rather, Truss Teek's growth in business was attributable to Diehl Lumber. As 
Bruce Hiller explained, when a truss customer called Diehl Lumber for trusses, it was 
Diehl's procedure to refer the truss customer to Truss Teck. (Tr. 339-40) In reality, 
Diehl was doing more than just acting as a broker in arranging the sale of trusses; it was 
in fact promoting a product — Truss Teck trusses — a product Diehl knew its customers, 
like Colonial, would purchase on its recommendation because of the Diehl name. 
Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Diehl was a broker 
between Colonial Lumber and Truss Teck for the truss sales involved in this case. 
Indeed, Diehl was not only arranging this sale; it was, in fact, marketing and promoting 
this product. 
B. 
DiehTs Active Participation In the Chain 
Of Distribution That Carried The Defective Truss Teck 
Trusses To End-Users Subjects It To Strict Liability In Tort 
In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979), 
this Court adopted strict liability in tort as embodied in Sec. 402(A) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. That section states, in relevant part, that: 
"(1) One who sells any product in the defective condition unreasonable 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for 
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate consumer or user, or to his 
property if 
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(a) seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product. . . . 
(Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 402(A)) 
The comments to the Restatement, which this Court has relied upon in the 
past, describes the purpose of the rule of strict liability as: 
"the ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety of the public 
undertaken by one who enters into the business of supply human beings with 
products which may endanger the safety of their persons and property, and the 
forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such 
goods." (Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 402(A) comment g (1965)). 
In view of the remedial purposes of the rule, the Courts have interpreted the 
term "seller" in section 402A broadly, finding that sellers comprise all parties who 
participate in moving the defective product through the chain of production, marketing 
and distribution. See, Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical Co., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 
179, 182 (1982); Jordon v. Sunnyslope Appliance, Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., 135 
Ariz. App. 309, 660 P.2d 1236, 1241-42 (1983); Hammond v. North American Asbestos 
Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210, 216 (1983); Dewberry v. LaFollette, 598 P.2d 241, 
242-43 (Okla. 1979); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 111. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 
401, 404 (1969). 
Indeed, the Court's have specifically found that liability under section 402A 
2 • . 
does not depend upon whether there was actual sales transaction, recognizing that it 
would not be reflective of business reality to restrict the application of section 402A to 
only those defendants who are sellers in the technical sense. See, e.g., Whitfield v. 
Cooper, 30 Conn. Supp. 47, 298 A.2d 50, 52 (1972); Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 
Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736, 738-39 (Pa. 1977); Gilbert v. Stone City Constr. Co., 357 N.E.2d 
1 See, Dowland v. Lyman Products for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380, 381 n.2 (Utah 1982) 
(Applying Restatement Sec. 402(A) and comment g) 
2 The Courts have soundly rejected Diehl's bald assertion that the definition of 
"sale" under Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code governs the scope of Sec. 
402(A). See, e.g., Henderson v. Gould, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 806, 808-10 (S.C. App. 
1986) 
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738, 742 (Ind. App. 1977); First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Cessna Air Craft Co., 365 So.2d 
966, 967-68 (Ala. 1978); Bounds v. Joslyn Mfg. Supply Co., 660 F. Supp. 1063, 1068-69 
(S.D. Miss. 1986); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chemical Co., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179, 
182-87 (1982); Hoffman v. Loos 6c Dilworth, Inc., 307 Pa. Super. 131, 452 A.2d 1349, 
1353-55 (1982); Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 
210, 216-17 (1983); Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 199, 704 P.2d 584, 588-89 
(1985); Henderson v. Gould, Inc., 288 S.C. 261, 341 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1986); Weber v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 285, 288-89 (D.N.J. 1986). 
There are, instead, other unique members of the American business scene 
who, while not sellers in the technical sense, nonetheless occupy a significant position in 
the marketing and distribution process, such as: 
— lessors (Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental Service Co., 45 N.J. 434, 
212 A.2d 769 (1965); Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 372 A.2d 736 
(Pa. 1977)); 
— bailors (Henderson v. Gould, Inc., 288 S.C. 261, 341 S.E.2d 806 (1986)); 
importers (Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 
774 (1975)); 
distributors (Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 199, 704 P.2d 584, 
588-89 (1985)); 
brokers (Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 
454 N.E.2d 210 (1983)); Weber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 
285 (D.N.J. 1986)) 
— order-takers (Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc., 307 Pa. Super. 131, 452 
A.2d 1349 (1982)) 
— commercial licensors (Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. 
Rptr. 420 (1970)). 
Because these parties are in the business of supplying and marketing consumer products, 
i.e. moving products through the stream of commerce, they likewise have assumed a 
special responsibility towards the consuming public. See, Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck 
Corp., 372 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. 1977). Thus, the imposition of liability on these parties is 
justified on the ground that their position in the marketing process enables them to exert 
pressure on the manufacturer to enhance the safety of the product. See, e.g. Hammond 
v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210, 216 (1983) 
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The decisions in Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 
454 N.E.2d 210 (1983), Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, 307 Pa. Super. 131, 452 A.2d 1349 
(1982), Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 199 704 P.2d 584 (1985), and Weber v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 285 (D.N.J. 1986) are instructive. 
In Hammond, defendant was a broker/agent for Cape Asbestos Corp. (Cape), 
which mined asbestos fiber in South Africa for sale world wide. Defendant was a contact 
point in North America for Cape customers, and primarily functioned as a message relay 
center between Cape and Cape's North American asbestos customers. In acting as an 
agent/broker for Cape, defendant received a 2-1/2% commission on all asbestos sales. 
(454 N.E.2d at 214) Defendant was held liable to plaintiff under strict liability for 
injuries plaintiff suffered due to asbestos exposure. On appeal, defendant argued it was 
not a seller as contemplated by Sec. 402(A) because it only acted as a broker by 
facilitating and and servicing Cape's asbestos sales contracts. Defendant further 
contended it never had control over the asbestos. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected 
these contentions concluding that "defendant's role in marketing the asbestos was 
sufficient to support liability under a strict liability theory," because it acted as the sole 
sales agent for Cape's product. (Id. at 216-17) 
In Zamora v. Mobile Corp., a distributor of propane gas bought propane from a 
manufacturer and sold it to a retailer who delivered the propane directly to the 
consumer. The distributor never had possession or control of the propane. "It bought and 
sold the gas completely as a paper transaction" and, in effect, was a broker of propane 
gas. (704 P.2d at 587) At issue was the legal effect of the distributor's role in the 
marketing the propane gas. The Washington Supreme Court held that the distributor was 
a member of the chain of distribution and therefore subject to strict liability and tort. 
The Court reasoned that the policies underlying the imposition of strict liability justified 
its imposition where the distributor had some identifiable role in placing the propane on 
the market: 
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ft[T]he policies underlying the imposition of strict liability justify its 
imposition in this case. The primary policy justification recognized by this 
Court for the extension of strict liability to all sellers in the chain of 
distribution is the provision of the 'maximum protection1 to the consumer. 
* * * 
That policy rationale is as applicable to sellers who never handle or control 
the product as it is to those sellers who do possess of control the product. In 
either case consumer protection is the ultimate factor considered by the 
Court. 
* * * 
[T]he degree of a seller's participation in the marketing process is less 
important . . . then the public protection consideration where, as here, a seller 
has had some identifiable role in placing the defective product on the 
market. 
Accordingly, based upon the literal terms of Sec. 402(A) and upon the public 
protection rationale for a broad interpretation of that section, we find that 
(the distributor) is appropriately included within the chain of distribution of 
the propane sold " (704 P.2d at 589 
In Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc., 307 Pa. Super. 131, 452 A.2d 1349 (Pa. 
Super. 1982) the defendants were the manufacturer and distributors of linseed oil. 
Plaintiff brought suit after she and her family were injured in a fire caused by the 
product. One defendant, the E. F. Kaufmann Company, claimed it was not liable under 
402(A) because of its limited role in the product's distribution. Although it received a 
commission for its efforts, Kaufmann did nothing more than take orders for the 
manufacturer — it took neither title to nor possession of the oil at any time during the 
sale. (452 A.2d at 1350, 1352 n.2.) Despite the fact that Kaufmann never had exercised 
direct control over the product, however, the Court imposed liability, concluding that 
Kaufmann was "directly involved" in the business of supplying linseed oil. (Id. at 1354-55) 
In Weber v. Johns-Manville, 630 F. Supp. 285 (D.N.J. 1986), the defendant, 
Pacor, Inc. acted as a broker — "a voice over the phone" — arranging the purchase and 
sale of asbestos. Its brokerage service was an isolated and limited feature of its overall 
business. (630 F. Supp. at 286, 288) It did not deliver the asbestos, but it did generate an 
invoice for the product. The Court nonetheless found Pacor strictly liable in tort 
because it was in the business of placing the product into the stream of commerce: 
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"Although (Pacor) may indeed have rendered a largely ministerial service, the 
record indicates that Pacor was more than a mere blind order-taker. Pacor 
was intimately involved in the asbestos industry for a number of years . . . 
Pacor was not an unsophisticated plyer of the trade. . . . 
* * * 
[W]hether considered a seller, distributor, or a provider of services (Pacor) 
arranged and profited from the supply of . . . asbestos . . . 
Pacor has caused itself to 'become part of the overall producing and 
marketing enterprise.1 (citation omitted) Its connection with the asbestos 
products, remote though it may be in comparison with that of other links in 
the chain, is a factual reality." (630 F. Supp. 289) 
Diehl's role as a broker and sales agent for Truss Teck was no different than 
the roles played by these defendants. Diehl was in the business of making brokered sales 
of roof trusses. Half of its gross revenues were derived from its brokered sales of such 
trusses, and other building products. Diehl arranged the sale of roof trusses by bringing 
the truss buyers and Truss Teck together, and at times shipped the trusses in its own 
trucks to the customer. Diehl profited from its efforts by taking a 5% brokerage fee on 
the sale of trusses, regardless of the amount of the sale. Like the defendants in Zamora 
and Hoffman, Diehl's role was more entreprenunial than neutral; it was directly involved 
in the business of placing roof trusses into the stream of commerce, and thus owed a 
special responsibility to the consuming public. 
But there was more to Diehl's role than this. Like the defendants in Hammond 
and Weber, Diehl was also part of the overall enterprise of marketing and distributing 
Truss Teck trusses. 
Diehl has been intimately involved in the lumber business for many years. Its 
large share of the market — $39 million in 1979 — demonstrated that many customers 
had come to rely upon its judgment in lumber and building matters. Diehl moreover was 
not an unsophisticated plyer of the trade — it knew about lumber products and it knew 
about lumber roof trusses. The fact that Diehl was able to immediately begin 
manufacturing trusses after Gary Diehl quit his business demonstrates Diehl's familiarity 
with this product. 
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Diehl had a unique and long-standing relationship with Truss Teck. Truss Teck 
was owned by Lawrence Diehl's son, and Diehl Lumber was helping Truss Teck get started 
in the business. One of these ways that Diehl helped Truss Teck was by promoting its 
product — roof trusses. As Hiller admitted Diehl had a policy regarding truss referrals — 
sell Truss Teck trusses. (Tr. 339-40) DiehPs motive was not merely altruistic; the more 
customers Diehl sent to Truss Teck, the more times Diehl was able to take its 5% fee on 
the sale. In other words, Diehl was not a "blind order-taker"; Diehl was in the market 
pushing Truss Teck trusses on the market for its own financial advantage and that of its 
offspring — Truss Teck, Inc. 
Diehl was also quite successful in promoting this product. Truss Teck had a 
phenomenal sales growth for a new business. Diehl obviously had many customers, such 
as Colonial Lumber, that relied upon its judgment regarding Truss Teck's products; and 
why not. Diehl was a trusted name in lumber and building products. It put its name on 
the referral to Truss Teck just as it put its name on the sales invoices for the trusses. As 
Diehl's customers obviously believed, Diehl would not stand behind a product unless it 
knew it was the best product on the market. 
Diehl had the kind of relationship with Truss Teck which justifies the 
imposition of strict liability. See, e.g. Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 
111. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d at 210, 216-17 (1983) Diehl's position in the marketing and 
distribution process enabled it to exert pressure on Truss Teck to build a safe truss. 
Diehl either could have stopped promoting the product, or more simply, Lawrence Diehl 
could have made sure that his son Gary was manufacturing a good and safe truss. Diehl 
was an expert in the lumber field; it had a unique opportunity to influence the 
manufacture of Truss Teckfs trusses. 
Diehl's efforts to promote Truss Teck's product demonstrates that it played a 
significantly active part in the marketing and distribution of trusses. Its connection with 
the product is a factual reality, and its promotional efforts were instrumental to Truss 
Teck's sales success. In short, Diehl's active participation in the chain of distribution 
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that carried the defective Truss Teck trusses to end-users subjects it to strict liability in 
tort. 
C. 
The Trial Court Properly Instructed The Jury 
As To The Law Of Strict Liability In Tort 
The trial court charged the jury with respect to the law of strict products 
liability as follows: 
"The law involved in this lawsuit is known as the law of strict products 
liability. Pursuant to this law, manufacturers, distributors, brokers, as well as 
all other parties in the chain of distribution are strictly liable for damages 
caused by defectively designed products. This is true so long as the party is in 
the business of, and gains profit from, distributing or otherwise disposing of 
the product in question through the stream of commerce. The primary 
justification for extending strict liability to all in the chain of distribution is 
to provide the 'maximum of protection1 to the consumer. This policy is as 
applicable to those who never handle or control the product, as it is to those 
who do possess or control the product. In either case, consumer protection is 
the ultimate factor considered. Consequently, the handling or possession of 
the product is not a prerequisite to the imposition of strict liability." 
Diehl raised only three objections at trial to this instruction. (R. 1349) Diehl 
objected to those portions of the instruction stating that the primary justification of 
strict liability was "the maximum of protection" to the consumer, and that consumer 
protection was the ultimate factor to be considered. Diehl also objected to that portion 
which stated that the policy underlying strict liability was applicable to those who never 
or control the product. (Tr. 450-51) 
It should be clear that Diehl's objections lacked merit. The instruction 
correctly stated the law of strict products liability, as that law is applied nationwide. 
The primary policy justification for strict liability is the provision of the "maximum of 
protection" to the consumer. Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 199, 704 P.2d 584, 
588-89 (1985) Moreover, that policy rationale is as applicable to those parties, such as a 
broker like Diehl, who never handle or control the product as it is to those who do possess 
or control the product. In either case, consumer protection is the ultimate factor 
considered by the courts. Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 704 P.2d at 589; See, e.g., Hammond 
v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210, 216-17 (1983) 
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Indeed, Diehl never explained below why this instruction misstated the law. 
(Tr. 450-51) Diehl's boilerplate objections, that these portions misstated the law, without 
discussing what specific law was misstated, were insufficient to preserve this assignment 
of error. See, Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D, Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860-61 
(Utah 1983). In its brief on appeal, Diehl now improperly attempts to expand on its 
generalized objections by making certain so called "policy" arguments. (Applt. Br. pp. 
20-32) As at trial, no case law is cited for its "policy" statements. This is not surprising, 
as Diehl's assertions are without merit. They are, in fact, no more than a diatribe 
against the law of strict liability which this Court adopted in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. 
Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). 
The following is typical of a Diehl "policy" argument against the imposition of 
strict liability in this case: 
"Why don't we say the plaintiff always wins, save the litigation costs and use 
the dough to pay the homeless and hungry? We could have some non-
adversarial summary process to keep out the patently frivolous claims. 
Justice will be done on average and much more cheaply." (Applt. Br. p. 32) 
This statement represents a gross misunderstanding of the reason why the rule of strict 
liability was created. It "was created judicially because of the economic and social need 
for the protection of consumers. . . . Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 
152, 157 (Utah 1979), quoting Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. 
Rptr. 380, 383-84 (1978). The rule was properly imposed upon Diehl simply because: 
Diehl was actively involved for profit in brokering, marketing and 
distributing Truss Teck trusses; and, 
— Diehl occupied a position where it could exert pressure on Truss Teck 
to manufacture a good and safe truss. 
Simply put, Diehl assumed a special responsibility towards the consuming 
public, including plaintiffs, by actively participating in the business of placing products 
into commerce. There is no good public policy reason that would justify allowing Diehl 
to evade that special responsibility. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED PLAINTIFFS 
TO INTRODUCE RELEVANT EVIDENCE OF DIEHL'S GROSS 
REVENUES AND DIEHL'S RELATIONSHIP WITH 
TRUSS TECK, INC. IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH 
ITS STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM 
Diehl complains that the trial Court erred in allowing plaintiffs to introduce 
evidence of its wealth. (Applt. Br. p. 39) This is inaccurate. Plaintiffs were only 
allowed to introduce evidence of Diehl!s gross revenue 1979 in in order to show its size 
and sophistication in the lumber industry, not its wealth. (Tr. 330-31) 
This evidence was relevant to plaintiffs' strict liability claim. It 
demonstrated that Diehl had developed a satisfied clientele that trusted in its judgment, 
and would do so when Diehl promoted the purchase of Truss Teck trusses. The evidence 
further demonstrated that Diehl had the economic muscle to exert pressure on Truss 
Teck to enhance the safety of its product. Simply put, this evidence was germane to 
plaintiffs' claim that Diehl played an active role in the chain of distribution of Truss 
Teck's product justifying the imposition of strict liability. Indeed, the fact that Diehl 
does no more in its brief than make a boilerplate objection that this evidence was just 
"irrelevant", shows that it does not seriously dispute the point that this evidence was 
pertinent to plaintiffs' claim. 
Furthermore, while Diehl now contends on appeal that this evidence was 
prejudicial, the record shows that Diehl did not object to this evidence on this ground at 
trial. (Tr. 330-31) Diehl has therefore failed to preserve this claim for review. Utah R. 
Evid. 103; See, Stagmeyer v. Leatham, 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279, 282 (1968) (A party 
must state a specific ground for objection to preserve the issue for review) In any event, 
the relevancy of the evidence outweighed any alleged prejudice to Diehl. See, State v. 
Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979) 
Moreover, because this evidence was relevant, it was unnecessary for the trial 
Court to give a corrective instruction to the jury regarding Diehl's gross revenues. The 
refusal to give an instruction is not a basis for reversal unless it appears that the jurors 
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were confused or misled and the error was prejudicial, and there can be no prejudicial 
error where the tendered instruction was covered by other instructions. See, Stratton v. 
Nielsen, 25 Utah 2d 124, 477 P.2d 152, 153 (1970) In the present case, the jury was 
instructed as to plaintiffs1 burden of proof, to consider the instructions as a whole 
without singling out any specific instruction or portion of that instruction, and to "weigh 
and consider this case without regard to sympathy, prejudice, or passion for or against 
any party to the action." (R. 1340-41, 1349) Thus, it cannot be said that the jury did not 
understand the specific relevant purpose for which the evidence was introduced: to 
demonstrate that defendant Diehl was a participant in the chain of distributing trusses. 
Diehl also claims that evidence at transcript pages 291-302, 309, 314-21, 324-
25, 331-32, 353-54 was improperly admitted to show its liability under a successor 
liability theory. (Applt. Br. p. 41) There are several serious flaws with Diehl's 
argument. 
First, the record is clear: plaintiffs1 claim that Diehl was strictly liable under 
a successor liability theory was always a part of this case prior to trial, as Judge Cornaby 
found in denying Diehl's motion for summary judgment: 
"I cannot tell from what has been given me whether . . . its strictly 
bookkeeping, just a service to Truss Teck, or is it a brokerage? I see it as a 
question of fact. Its along with the successor liability. I think both of those 
are things that bring it into question that you're going to have to present to a 
jury. . . ." (Tr. of 10/20/87 at 15) (emphasis supplied) 
Secondly, this evidence was relevant to plaintiffs1 strict liability claim that 
Diehl played a major role in placing trusses into the stream of commerce. This evidence 
described the relationship between Diehl and Truss Teck in the marketing and 
distribution of trusses. Diehl's relationship with Truss Teck demonstrated that it actively 
participated in the chain of distribution of trusses, and could have exerted pressure on 
Truss Teck to manufacturer a good and safe truss. It is this relationship that Diehl 
wanted to keep hidden from the jury in its defense of the strict liability claim, and which 
it has kept hidden from this Court in its brief. 
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Finally, because this evidence was relevant to plaintiffs1 strict liability claim, 
there was no need to give a corrective instruction concerning this evidence, as Diehl 
speciously asserts. Indeed, in as much as the record does not show that Diehl ever 
requested the kind of corrective instruction referred to in its brief (See, Applt. Br, 41), it 
has waived this point for appeal. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036, 1037 
(Utah 1975) 
There is a presumption in the verity of the verdict and judgment, including all 
aspects of the conduct of the proceedings and rulings of the trial Court. Upon appeal, 
appellant has the burden of showing there was substantial and prejudicial error which had 
the effect of depriving him of the opportunity of a full and fair presentation and 
consideration of the disputed issues. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974) No such error emerges from the instant record or 
from Diehl's brief. 
IV. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT TRUSWAL WAS NOT 
AT FAULT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
In its brief on appeal, Diehl makes two final arguments directed against 
Truswal. These claims do not affect the jury verdict and judgment entered against Diehl 
and in favor of plaintiffs since the verdict and judgment holding Diehl strictly liable to 
plaintiffs for the damages caused by the defective roof trusses is supported by 
substantial evidence and is in accordance with the law. Nonetheless, for the convenience 
of this Court, plaintiffs wish to point out certain inaccuracies in Diehl!s argument. 
First, Diehl claims that the trial Court erred in dismissing its cross-claim 
against Truswal. (Applt. Br. pp. 41-43) This is inaccurate. The record does not indicate 
that any order was entered dismissing Diehl's cross-claim prior to trial. Moreover, at 
trial, it was Truswal's counsel who elected not to participate in the trial based upon its 
settlement with plaintiffs. (Tr. pp. 18-19) 
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Secondly, Diehlfs assertion in its brief that it "expected to have any judgment 
against it reduced by the greater of the amount of Truswal's fault or the amount paid by 
Truswal in settlement and expected to have Truswal's fault determined at trial" is 
misleading. (Applt. Br. p. 42) Diehl was afforded the opportunity to fully litigate the 
issue of Truswalfs fault at trial. It simply produced no direct evidence to show that 
Truswal was at fault. 
With respect to Diehl's claim against Truswal, the Court instructed the jury 
that Diehl had the burden of proving each of the following: 
— that Truswal provided design engineering to Truss Teck for the roof 
trusses that failed; 
that the design engineering provided by Truswal was used by Truss Teck 
in its manufacture of the roof trusses; 
that the design engineering by Truswal was unreasonably dangerous and 
defective; 
that the Truswal unreasonably dangerous and unsafe design engineering 
was approximate cause of the roof collapse. (R. 1361) 
The evidence was clear to the jury as it should be clear to this Court. Diehl 
simply failed to produce any direct evidence that Truswal provided Truss Teck with any 
design, much less an erroneous one, for the manufacture of the roof truss system. Diehl's 
own expert, Vance Christenson, made this clear by explaining that he had never seen nor 
reviewed any "design drawings that were . . . sent by any engineering firm to" Truss 
Teck. (Tr. 408) If this was not enough, Diehlfs counsel made this point during his closing 
argument: 
"(Mr. Draney): Now, lastly before I finish, I would like to talk about Diehl 
Lumber Company's claims against Truswal. Now, it's true that we don't have 
the design in hand. . . . You know, we don't have designs. . . ." (Tr. 501) 
Without a design, Diehl had no direct proof showing that Truswal was at fault. 
Indeed, far from showing that Truswal was at fault, much of the evidence 
pointed to Truss Teck and its "sloppy fabrication" of the trusses used in the roof on the 
Fairway warehouse. (Tr. 190, 192-92, 197-98, 202-3) In fact, perhaps the most telling 
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remark concerning Truss Teck!s fault was made by Mr. Gary Diehl, the former president 
of Truss Teck. When shown Plaintiffs Exhibit 39 — part of the roof truss taken from the 
scene of the collapse — Mr. Diehl remarked: !,I can see quite a bit wrong with that." 
(Tr. 323) 
There were no irregularities occurring during this trial. Substantial evidence 
supports the jury's determination that Truswal was not at fault. The amount paid in 
settlement by Truswal has been deducted from the judgment entered against Diehl. The 
entire judgment was correct and proper and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated and upon the authorities cited, Plaintiff-
Respondent respectfully pray that the orders and judgment of the District Court be 
affirmed. 
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